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Abstract: 
This paper investigates the role of political representation in explaining 
geographical variation in social security and income tax transfers in Belgium. The 
transfers we consider are the net amount of federal income taxes and social 
security contributions paid and in-cash social benefits received. These make up 
the core of the Belgian welfare state and income redistribution. For the 1995-
2010 period, we find that these transfers to inhabitants of a particular Belgian 
electoral district increase significantly with every extra federal minister originating 
from that electoral district. Given that such transfers are largely formula-based, 
and if anything would be easier to target across social groups rather than 
geographically, this result is surprising. Nevertheless, the result is robust to 
controlling for economic and demographic variables that are important 
determinants of transfers, i.e. (gross) income per capita and the share of the 
unemployed, the young and the retired, as well as to controlling for the share of 
parliamentary seats of the governing coalition per electoral district. The observed 
correlation between political representation and transfers is suggestive of a 
system with simultaneous causation, with politicians steering transfers to their 
constituencies in the hope to gain votes; and where voters in turn reward 
politicians in the hope to gain transfers. To isolate and quantify the causal link 
going from political representation to transfers, we identify two sets of exogenous 
changes in political representation and use an instrumental variable approach. A 
first set considers changes in political representation due to ministers having to 
resign, mainly due to political crises and scandals. A second set considers 
changes in the political representation due to changes in the borders of electoral 
districts in 2002. 
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1 Introduction 
 
This paper investigates the role of political variables in explaining geographical 
variation in social security and personal income tax transfers in Belgium. In a simple 
fixed effects specification using data on income and transfers collected by the central 
bank of Belgium (NBB) for the years 1995 to 2010, we find that cash transfers to an 
electoral district are 21 euros higher per capita and year, for every federal minister 
originating from that electoral district. This result is robust to controlling for local 
economic and demographic variables such as the local share of retired, minors and 
unemployed in the population. This observed correlation does not prove or quantify a 
causal link going from political representation to increasing transfers to an electoral 
district. We rather consider this result to be thought provoking, as such transfers are 
typically formula based, and suggestive of a mechanism of mutual causation, where 
government executives cater for their electorate using cash transfers in the hope of 
being rewarded with re-election.  
 
Although we believe that the observed correlation between representation in the 
executive and transfers is an interesting result in itself, we subsequently attempt to 
isolate the causal effect of a change in political representation on transfers by 
considering purely exogenous changes in executive representation and use this 
information in an instrumental variable analysis. 
 
Our paper is most closely related to Crampton (2004) and Milligan and Smart 
(2005) for Canada and to Golden and Picci (2008) for Italy. In these contributions, 
the distribution of discretionary grants over electoral districts is explained by the 
number of cabinet ministers per electoral district and by the number of parliamentary 
seats won by the government. Other closely related work is Evans (2005) and Jutras 
and Vaillancourt (2008), who explain the distribution of formula-based fiscal transfers 
resulting from the income tax and the social security system over Canadian electoral 
districts by the total number of available parliamentary seats per province. 
 
Belgium is a federal country “sui generis” in that its political parties are split along 
linguistic lines and –leaving aside the electoral district of Brussel-Halle-Vilvoorde- 
along geographical lines. Since the 1970s there has not been a federal member of 
parliament who obtained votes in both main communities of the country. At the same 
time the income disparities between the southern French speaking Walloon Region 
and the northern Dutch speaking Flemish Region have been large and persistent. In 
combination with a progressive federal tax system, a high federal tax burden, and a 
large social budget, these income disparities are among the causes of the 
considerable and persistent net fiscal transfers between the 3 Regions in Belgium, 
with the Flemish region as a net payer and the Walloon Region a net receiver; and 
the central Brussels Capital Region showing either small outgoing or incoming net 
fiscal transfers according to most studies.  
 
In Belgium, as in many countries, the executive dominates the legislative, and 
cabinet ministers do so prominently. When looking for a political explanation of the 
geographical distribution of fiscal transfers in Belgium, we are therefore inclined to 
focus on the geographical distribution of federal cabinet ministers. Although the 
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French speaking community only accounts for some 40 percent of the total Belgian 
population, the number of federal government ministers from both main linguistic 
communities is equal by law. Any attempt to explain changes in the amount of 
transfers between Regions by changes in the number of government ministers from 
the Flemish and the Francophone communities would therefore be futile. We hence 
rather opt to explain the distribution of federal fiscal transfers between the 20 Belgian 
electoral districts into which Belgium was divided on the occasion of the 1995 and 
1999 federal elections for the House of Representatives.  
 
In 2002 a law was voted merging these 20 districts into 11 larger “provincial” 
electoral districts2. The maps in Annex 3 show the original and the new electoral 
districts, together with their respective sizes in terms of total parliamentary seats to 
win. The re-shuffling of electoral districts poses both a practical problem and an 
opportunity for the analysis. In the first part of our analysis, we will ignore the change 
in electoral districts and make the assumption that also during the latter half of our 
sample period federal ministers kept on targeting mainly their smaller “old” electoral 
districts, even after the “provincial” electoral districts had come into effect3. In the 
second part, we fully take into account the change in the borders of electoral 
districts, and use this change to isolate changes in political representation which are 
exogenous to current or previous transfers. These exogenous changes will be used 
to identify causally how political representation in the executive affects transfers 
using an instrumental variable analysis. A separate IV setup utilises changes in 
political representation which are due to ministers having to resign, mainly due to 
political crises and scandals, as instruments. 
 
We do not know of previous attempts to explain the geographical distribution of 
fiscal transfers in Belgium by means of a combination of political, demographic and 
economic variables 4 . There exists anecdotal evidence of political room for 
manoeuvre in allocating expenditures geographically. One example is the recent 
accusation of “pork barrel” politics by both the prime minister and the minister of 
economy in the di Rupo government (Le Vif / L’Express 2012, and Pauwels and Van 
                                                          
2
 With the notable exceptions of the old electoral districts of Brussel-Halle-Vilvoorde and of Leuven, which 
were kept into existence. So after the 2002 reform, Belgium was left with 11 electoral districts, of which 9 truly 
provincial. 
3
 Golden and Picci (2008 p. 272) make a similar assumption. Saarimaa and Tukiainen (2013) find evidence 
for Finland that voters keep voting for political representatives living in their original, smaller electoral districts 
to the same extent after the merging of these smaller districts into a larger electoral district.  
As a robustness check, we have re-conducted our analysis below while assuming the 11 “provincial” 
electoral districts held during our entire sample period. This assumption does not affect our main findings, 
although the lower number of observations reduces the precision of the estimates in a number of analyses.  
Another complicating factor is the (small) number of ministers who had been elected for the Senate over 
our sample period. Their number is on average less than 2 per year over our sample period, out of a total of 14 
to 15 ministers per year. As opposed to the House of Representatives, the Senate is characterized by only 2 
electoral districts, i.e. the Flemish community and the French-speaking community. However, we assume that 
also ministers elected for the Senate would predominantly target the electoral district which would be theirs if 
they would have run for the House of Representatives, i.e. the House’s electoral district in which they reside. 
Reasons are that the geographical scope of a minister’s reelection efforts seems naturally limited and that in 
Belgium members of parliament are not sure for which part of parliament they will be requested by their party 
to run during the next elections, the House of Representatives or the Senate. 
4
 Studies explaining the geographical distribution of fiscal transfers in Belgium that did not control for 
political factors are Deleeck e.a. (1989), and its update by Cantillon and De Maesschalck (2007).  
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den Eynde 2012). But while “pork barrel” traditionally refers to discretionary 
investment expenditures, in this paper we look at the geographical distribution of the 
income tax and social security contributions and expenditures, which are two 
important transfer categories which are firmly based on legislation, and therefore –
presumably- formula-based. The social expenditures we consider comprise all major 
social transfer categories in Belgium. In decreasing order of financial weight, these 
are pensions, unemployment benefits, child allowances, work disability allowances, 
allowances for the handicapped, and subsistence allowances 5 . In the following 
paragraphs, we give some examples of how there might exist some scope for 
geographical tailoring within these types of transfers. 
 
 A first example of how ministers could cater for their constituency is the creation 
of ever new target group measures in social security (e.g. employment schemes and 
rebates in social security contributions) and in the tax system (e.g. targeted tax 
rebates), although it is easier to imagine such tailoring to take place on a larger 
Regional level than on a smaller electoral district level. There are dozens of such 
targeted measures, some of which have led to criticism precisely because of their 
asymmetric regional impact (for example the so-called `Rosetta’ measures). 
Ironically, attempts to simplify the federal legislation have equally been criticised 
because of their regional impact, and some proposals have been blocked in 2009 by 
the Flemish regional parliament to force renegotiations on the federal level. 
 
An alternative way for politicians to steer transfers to an area as small as their 
electoral district, might operate not through the creation of new legislation related to 
income taxation and social security, but through the (non-)application of existing 
legislation. E.g. politicians may prod local branches of the tax and social security 
administrations towards lenient taxation and social security audits. Indeed, 
considerable geographical disparity in the number of tax and social security audits 
has been found to exist6 (Deloitte 2010).  
 
Further scope for geographical tailoring is offered by the fact that the agreement 
of the federal minister of employment is required to secure exceptional state-funded 
early retirement for its employees for any firm that has gone out of business. The 
starting age of eligibility for such early retirement appears to be decided case by 
case. This age appears to vary between 50 and 58 depending on the negotiation 
outcome.  
 
Eligibility for a number of other social benefits and the particular amount of them 
inevitably depends upon a judgement call, all the more so in Belgium as the related 
legislation is complicated. This holds in particular for sickness and work disability 
allowances. Over the last 10 years, the number of beneficiaries of a sickness or a 
work disability allowance in Belgium has steeply increased. The press has reported 
that such allowances have increasingly been used by the federal government as a 
complement to –sometimes meagre- retirement benefits. However, beneficiaries 
have to formally request such a complement before receiving it, requiring decisions 
                                                          
5
 The latter 2 categories are not formally part of the Belgian social security system, i.e. they are 100% 
funded out of tax revenues other than social security contributions. 
6
 In Belgium there exists quite some anecdotal evidence on pervasive fraud and evasion possibilities with 
respect to the payment of the personal income tax and of social security contributions, as well as with respect 
to the benefiting of social allowances.  
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at the level of the ministry. Similarly, the Ministry of Social Affairs has to approve 
individual requests by self-employed who wish to have the payment of their social 
security contributions waived or postponed because of the economic crisis. Also 
subsistence allowances are approved on a case by case basis depending on means-
testing of the claimant. 
 
In Belgium the federal government decides unanimously on policy and proposals 
for new legislation through a council of all ministers which meets regularly. This 
setting offers plenty of scope for negotiation and bargaining among ministers, and 
makes that a minister with competencies unrelated to fiscal or social affairs can 
nevertheless weigh on decisions related to these topics affecting its constituency. 
Simultaneously, it is well known that most Belgian federal politicians do not spend 
their entire working week in the capital city where the federal ministries and the 
federal parliament are located. They divide their time between the capital city and 
their electoral district, to keep in touch with their constituents, even if they have not 
been simultaneously elected to a local office. Some have regular “visiting hours” at 
their municipality of residence, where they regularly receive questions and requests 
from their constituents.  
 
The combination of this local presence, the bargaining power at the council of 
ministers, and the complicatedness and non-automatic application of important parts 
of the income tax and social security system suggest that the Belgian income tax 
and social security systems may be less formula-based than that they appear at first 
sight. There is scope for discretion by politicians to shape legislation, influence the 
implementation, or affect decisions in specific cases. The topic of the remainder of 
this paper is to answer the question on whether this influence indeed exists and to 
quantify it. Section 2 gives an overview of the distributive politics literature in the 
context of which our paper is to be situated. Section 3 describes the main dependent 
and independent variables we consider in our analysis. Section 4 consists of the 
actual empirical analysis of social and fiscal transfers and the quantification of the 
effect of ministerial representation. Section 5 draws a number of conclusions. 
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2 Literature overview 
 
Our paper does not consider the political economy of income redistribution as 
such, but only in as far as this redistribution has a geographical impact. Its subject 
therefore is distributive politics as defined by Weingast et al. (1981 p. 644). The key 
starting point of the distributive politics literature is that politicians are elected locally 
to hold office nationally, and that political parties have to win votes locally -by means 
of income redistribution- to come to power nationally.  
 
Three strands can be distinguished within the distributive politics literature. The 
first strand centres around the “common pool problem” and the “law of many 
districts”, again with reference to Weingast et al. (1981). The second strand can be 
labelled the “core district” literature, with reference to Cox (2006). The third strand 
can be labelled the “swing district” literature, with reference to Lindbeck and Weibull 
(1987).  
 
A first statement of the “common pool problem” literature is that the local election 
of politicians gives them an incentive to favour their geographical constituency with 
expenditure projects, including by means of income redistribution. This pays off 
when the bulk of the benefits of expenditure accrue locally, while the financing is 
borne nationally, through national taxation. A related hypothesis by Weingast (1981 
p. 654) is that the lower the fraction of total taxes that is paid by a particular district, 
the higher its demand for central government expenditures will be, and hence the 
higher overspending will be. With more (and therefore smaller) districts, the tax price 
charged to a particular district for expenditures received will be lower, and hence the 
district’s demand for expenditures will be higher. I.a. Elvik (1995) and Helland and 
Sørensen (2009) find empirical evidence for this “law of many districts” for Norway, 
while i.a. Hird (1991), DelRossi and Inman (1999) and Aidt and Shvets (2012) do so 
for the US. 
 
A second prediction of the “common pool problem” literature is that overspending 
would increase with the number of politicians –ministers or members of parliament- 
representing an electoral district. We would call this second prediction the “law of 
well-represented districts” – as opposed to the “law of many districts”. Examples of 
its empirical confirmation with respect to the number of parliamentary seats per 
district are Ansolabehere et al. (2002) for the US, and Jutras and Vaillancourt (2008) 
for Canada.  
 
To a large extent the contribution of Weingast et al. (1981) disregards the 
important role that political parties play with respect to distributive politics in many 
countries. A second and third strand in the distributive politics literature fill this gap, 
respectively with the “core district” and “swing district” hypotheses.   
 
Cox and McCubbins (1986) define core voters as voters with a strong preference 
for a particular party. The geographic version of the “core” hypothesis (Cox 2006) 
states that (risk-averse) political parties have an incentive to redistribute income in 
favour of districts where they obtain a majority of the votes (core districts) rather than 
those where no party has a clear majority (swing districts). In doing so, they prevent 
abstention of core district voters (labelled “mobilization” by Cox, 2006, p. 19) and 
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prevent emergence of competing political parties in their core districts (labelled 
“coordination” by Cox, 2006, p. 19). Otherwise stated: they prevent that core districts 
become swing districts in the next election.  
 
Hence Cox (2006) predicts that the more a particular electoral district supports 
the governing coalition, the more it will be favoured with income redistribution. Cox’ 
theory can hence be considered as the inclusion of the role of political parties into 
the “law of well-represented districts”. Examples of empirical confirmation of Cox’ 
“core district” theory are Levitt and Snyder (1995) and Bickers and Stein (2000) for 
the US Congress, and Ansolabehere and Snyder (2006) for US state governments.  
 
Juxtaposed to the “core voter” hypothesis stands the “swing voter” theory of 
Lindbeck and Weibull (1987) and Dixit and Londregan (1995), which can be 
considered a third strand in the distributive politics literature. An example of empirical 
confirmation of the corresponding swing district hypothesis is Bickers and Stein 
(1996) for the US Congress7.  
 
Crampton (2004) and Milligan and Smart (2005) for Canada, and Helland and 
Sørensen (2009) for Norway, find evidence both in favour of the “law of well-
represented districts” and in favour of the swing district hypothesis. 
 
A final contribution to the distributive politics theory we consider is McGillivray 
(2004), as summarized in Golden and Picci (2008 p. 271-273). McGillivray integrates 
two extra variables into the “core district” / “swing district” hypotheses: (1) type of 
electoral system and (2) strength of party system.  
 
Firstly, a proportional electoral system means that targeting swing districts is less 
rewarding for the ruling coalition compared to within a majoritarian system: the 
probability that being the largest party in swing districts would be decisive for holding 
office is (much) smaller in proportional electoral systems. Hence the ruling coalition 
is expected to target core districts, to prevent the emergence of new parties 
(“coordination” in Cox’ terminology). The reverse is expected to hold in majoritarian 
systems, where emergence of new parties seems less of a threat to the governing 
party than in proportional systems.  
 
Secondly, within a strong party system, there seems less room for individual 
powerful party members such as ministers to target fiscal transfers to their electoral 
district, compared to within a weak party system. This is because strong parties 
would make sure transfers are spent in the overall interest of the party rather than in 
the interest of powerful party members (McGillivray 2004 and Golden and Picci  
2008 p. 271-272). Cox (2006 p. 17-19) argues, however, that the direction of extra 
transfers towards districts of powerful party members should not be interpreted as a 
sign of a weak party system. Crampton (2004 p. 16) gives the example of Canada, 
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 Dahlberg and Johansson (2002) and Johansson (2003) are sometimes cited as examples of confirmation 
of the “swing district” hypothesis for Sweden. However, as Cox (2006 p. 10) correctly points out, the Swedish 
studies are confirmations of the “swing voter” hypothesis of Lindbeck and Weibull, as opposed to the “swing 
district” hypothesis. The object of study of Dahlberg and Johansson are swing voters in different municipalities 
lying in several electoral districts, rather than the electoral districts themselves. They shed light on which 
municipalities obtain more discretionary grants from the central government within districts, not on the 
distribution of such grants across electoral districts. 
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with a strong party system, where “(…) all the stops are pulled to defend contestable 
seats held by Cabinet Ministers”. Perhaps strong party systems allow extra transfers 
to ministers’ constituencies to occur as a compensation of services provided by 
ministers to their party while holding office.  
 
As Belgium is a country with a proportional electoral system, this suggests that 
we might expect incumbent political parties to steer redistributive transfers towards 
their core districts, all the more so because Belgium also has very strong political 
parties. It however seems unclear a priori to which extent such transfers to core 
districts could go together with government ministers favouring their own electoral 
districts with extra transfers. As political parties and the members of the executive 
taken together seem to be the key actors within the Belgian political system, we will 
test hereafter the influence of ministers on the geographical allocation of transfers in 
Belgium while controlling for the influence of political parties. 
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3 Description of the main dependent and independent 
variables 
 
This study considers only cash transfers from and to households through social 
security contributions and social expenditures and personal income taxation. Social 
security benefits in kind, i.e. health care expenditures, are not included, due to lack 
of data. All data on transfers was obtained from the NBB website8 for the period 
1995-2010 at the administrative “arrondissement” level of geographical 
disaggregation.  
 
The transfers considered represent a large share of the geographical fiscal 
transfers in Belgium and their budgetary impact is large. At the contribution side it 
comprises two of the three by far most important sources of funding of the federal 
government, i.e. the personal income tax and social security contributions. In 2010, 
Belgian personal income tax revenue and social security contributions equalled 
28.2% resp. 32.5% of total federal tax revenue 9  (well above the resp. OECD 
averages). Total tax revenue in Belgium equalled 43.8% of GDP in 2010, the 3rd 
highest share of all OECD-countries. As mentioned before, at the benefits side, our 
dependent variable comprises all major social transfer categories in Belgium. 
According to the OECD, social spending in Belgium equalled 29.6% of GDP in 2010, 
again the 3rd highest share of all OECD-countries. When transposing these numbers 
to the household level, over our sample period household gross annual income 
appears to have been reduced on average with 18.2% by the income tax, while 
having been reduced on average with 27.1% by social security contributions, and 
having been increased on average with 26.0% by social expenditures payable to 
households. 
  
Graphs 1a (for the 10 Flemish electoral districts and the mixed Brussel-Halle-
Vilvoorde district) and 1b (for the 9 Francophone electoral districts) show the 
evolution of cash transfers through social security contributions and expenditures 
and personal income taxes over time per electoral district, expressed in 1000 euros 
per capita terms, and deflated by the consumer price index for Belgium10. It is clear 
from the graphs that all electoral districts are net payers to the federal state. This is 
mainly due to the fact that our fiscal transfer data comprise the personal income tax 
and social security contributions at the revenue side, and only (part of) social 
benefits at the expenditure side.  
 
 
 
 
                                                          
8
 www.nbb.be/doc/dq/n/dq3/NNR.pdf; this is the only source of geographically disaggregated Belgian 
federal revenue and expenditure data we are aware of. 
9
 www.oecd.org; OECD statistics consider social security contributions as a part of tax revenue, which 
makes sense for Belgium, as social security contributions are mandatory, and as there is no one-on-one 
relationship between contributions and benefits any individual pays and receives. 
10
 Taken from Statistics Belgium (http://statbel.fgov.be/). 
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Graphs 1a and 1b: The evolution of fiscal transfers per electoral district, in real 
1000 euro per capita terms, for Flanders and Francophone Belgium resp. (1995-2010) 
 
 
Source: NBB 
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The graphs also show large differences in net transfers between the electoral 
district paying the most per capita on a net basis and the electoral district paying the 
least. But perhaps most striking is the overall persistence of the relative positions of 
the electoral districts over time, with a number of Francophone districts persistently 
contributing the least of all districts to the federal government, and a number of 
Flemish districts persistently contributing among the most of all districts to the federal 
government. These quite large and persistent differences are obviously related to the 
equally large and persistent income differences between the typical Francophone 
Belgian electoral district and the typical Flemish electoral district. The persistence in 
large between-district-differences in net transfers will pose a challenge to our attempt 
in the analysis below to explain the relatively small within-district-changes in fiscal 
and social transfers over time by political factors. Nevertheless, some electoral 
districts did fare better or worse than others over time, with some changes in relative 
positions as a consequence. 
 
As for our major political variable, graphs 2a and 2b show the evolution of the 
number of federal ministers per 100.000 inhabitants for the separate electoral 
districts. Data was obtained from the federal parliament of Belgium and Wikipedia. 
For election years the distribution of ministers of the outgoing government was used. 
In these graphs, for the years after 2002, when the “provincial” districts reform was 
voted into law, we kept on assigning ministers to the old electoral district they had 
run for in the previous federal election. Newly elected ministers were assigned to an 
old electoral district on the basis of residence.  
 
Graphs 2a and 2b reveal not only considerable variation between electoral 
districts in terms of the number of ministers elected in a particular district per 
100,000 inhabitants, but also –in contrast to the transfers shown in graphs 1a and 
1b- considerable variation over time11. In 62 of our 320 district-year observations, the 
absolute number of ministers per district changes. The graphs show that –
unsurprisingly- changes in (provenance of) ministers occur mainly in the years 
following federal election years (i.e. in years 199612, 2000, 2004, and 2008). The red 
vertical bars in the graphs mark election years.  
 
 
 
 
 
  
                                                          
11
 So called secretaries of state were not counted. Secretaries of state are in charge of policy areas 
considered less important and they are not allowed to participate in the weekly meetings of the “Council of 
Ministers”, i.e. the entire cabinet of ministers, which jointly takes the main government decisions. Their only 
way to influence the decisions of the Council of Ministers is by requesting the Minister to whom they are 
“attached” to make their case. Also, the budget at the disposal of secretaries of state to hire personal advisors 
so as to staff their private “cabinets” appears considerably smaller than that of federal ministers. As a 
robustness check, we have included these junior ministers into our regression analysis below. The association 
between ministers –including secretaries of state- and transfers remains highly significant, but the size of the 
coefficient becomes somewhat smaller. This is consistent with the findings of Golden and Picci (2008 p. 286) 
for Italy. 
12
 As the result of the 1995 elections was the continuation of the outgoing federal government coalition, 
minister changes were very limited in 1996. 
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Graphs 2a and 2b: The evolution of the number of ministers per electoral 
district, per 100,000 inhabitants (1995-2010) 
 
 
Sources: Wikipedia, federal parliament of Belgium, own calculations 
0
.2
.4
.6
.8
1
9
9
5
1
9
9
6
1
9
9
7
1
9
9
8
1
9
9
9
2
0
0
0
2
0
0
1
2
0
0
2
2
0
0
3
2
0
0
4
2
0
0
5
2
0
0
6
2
0
0
7
2
0
0
8
2
0
0
9
2
0
1
0
year
Aalst-Oudenaarde Antwerpen
Brugge Brussel-Halle-Vilvoorde
Gent-Eeklo Kortrijk-Roeselare-Tielt
Leuven Limburg
Mechelen-Turnhout Sint-Niklaas-Dendermonde
Veurne-Diksmuide-Ieper-Oostende
0
.2
.4
.6
.8
1
1
9
9
5
1
9
9
6
1
9
9
7
1
9
9
8
1
9
9
9
2
0
0
0
2
0
0
1
2
0
0
2
2
0
0
3
2
0
0
4
2
0
0
5
2
0
0
6
2
0
0
7
2
0
0
8
2
0
0
9
2
0
1
0
year
Brabant Wallon Charleroi-Thuin
Huy-Waremme Liège
Luxembourg Mons-Soignies
Namur Tournai-Ath-Mouscron
Verviers
13 
But there also seem to be a lot of exceptions to this rule, i.e. 33 out of 62 minister 
changes did not occur in post-election years. This is because, as opposed to 
members of parliament, politicians are not elected to be a minister (nor re-elected) 
for an entire legislature, but appointed (and dismissed) for a non-predetermined time 
period. Formally appointments are made by the head of state, but de facto the 
positions are divided between parties after the elections during negotiations between 
party presidents. When deemed necessary, party presidents appoint another person 
between elections13. E.g. the Leterme – Van Rompuy governments between 2008 
and 2010 consisted of several ministers who had not participated or had not been 
elected in the preceding 2007 federal elections. However, most of the time, such 
unelected ministers participate in subsequent elections (and mostly successfully). 
The large number of changes in political representation which happen between 
elections inspired us to consider a subset of them as exogenous to fiscal transfers 
and use them as instruments to identify a causal effect of political representation on 
transfers in section 4. 
Finally Table 1 presents summary statistics for our socio-economic control 
variables for the year 2010. The reported standard deviation therefore only reflects 
differences between districts. The numbers show that the significant differences 
between districts in terms of transfers per capita which were shown in Figures 2a 
and 2b also hold for socio-economic variables such as the share of unemployed in 
the total population. 
Table 1: Means and between standard deviations for socio-economic 
variables per electoral district (2010) 
 
 Transfers 
(1000 
euros per 
capita) 
Gross 
income 
(1000 
euros per 
capita) 
Minors  
(% of 
population) 
Unemployed  
(% of 
population) 
Retired  
(% of 
population) 
Mean -3.29 17.14 22.94 3.93 15.06 
Standard 
deviation 
1.19 2.42 1.59 1.70 1.77 
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4 Empirical analysis 
 
 
Weingast’s politico-economic mechanism described in section 2 can be 
summarized as a system in which -in our case- ministers cater to their constituency 
in order to gain votes, and in which the electorate in turn rewards ministers for their 
services. We represent this in a stylized way through the following system of 
equations (omitting other covariates, as well as indices for electoral districts or time): 
 
        (1) 
        (2) 
 
The first equation of this system states that transfers T to some electoral district 
are a linear function of a measure of ministerial (over)representation M. The second 
equation models ministerial (over)representation M of an electoral district as a linear 
function of transfers towards an electoral district. 
 
Solving this system of equations for the equilibrium amount of ministerial 
representation shows  
 
   
     
      
 
 
(3) 
 
If we would estimate equation (1) in isolation, ignoring the simultaneous 
determination of the variables described by the full system of equations, the OLS 
estimate of coefficient b1 is given by  
 
      
        
      
 
 
 
Using the solution for M from equation (3) and its dependence on the error term 
u, this can be written as 
 
        
  
      
  
      
      
     
 
      
  
         
      
 (4) 
 
Expression (4) shows that the OLS estimate of equation (1) in isolation is in 
general biased. The second term shows the effect of ignoring reverse causality, in 
case transfers affect ministerial representation (for example by increasing re-election 
chances) such that    . The third term shows the effect of the presence of 
common or correlated omitted variables in both equations causing              
 
In our empirical application, we will attempt to limit omitted variable bias by 
including dummies per electoral district to capture any time-invariant differences 
between electoral districts, as well as year-dummies capturing shocks common to all 
districts in a certain year, and district-specific year-trends to accommodate any 
omitted trending variables. In addition, we include the average district income and 
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the share of dependent inhabitants (retired, unemployed, minors) as economic and 
demographic controls. These variables clearly affect a district’s transfers, but 
omitting them would only bias estimates should these variables also affect the 
average ministerial representation of a district – and it is not straightforward to 
imagine how this would work. In one specification we control for other political 
variables which could affect a district’s transfers such as the share of parliamentary 
seats held by the governing coalition in that district, and could also affect the 
ministerial representation of that district (say if the coalition rewards that district with 
a minister if it delivered a lot of parliamentary seats to the coalition). Given the 
inclusion of these controls, we might hope to minimize the omitted variable bias. 
 
In section 0, we will ignore the simultaneity bias and estimate equation (1) in 
isolation, while adding controls as described above. As shown by expression (4), 
when omitted variable bias is properly controlled for, the estimated coefficient on the 
ministerial representation variable M will be a combination of the true coefficient b1, 
and the coefficient determining the reverse causality b2. The estimation results in 
this section therefore do not have a causal interpretation, as they do not reflect the 
effect of an exogenous change in the ministerial representation of a district on the 
incoming transfers. Nevertheless, we find it important to report these results, as 
finding significant correlation between transfers and ministerial representation 
implies that either      or      or both. As such, a significant coefficient in the 
single equation framework is interesting in itself, as it suggests some political-
economy mechanism may be at work causing the observed correlation between 
ministerial representation and transfers.  
 
In section 0, we will identify two separate sets of exogenous changes in political 
representation which we use to identify the causal effect of political representation on 
transfers by means of an instrumental variables analysis. Using a subset of 
exogenous changes in ministerial representation, M*, which are unrelated to current 
and past transfers, we are able to obtain unbiased estimates as by assumption 
cov(M*,u)=0.  
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4.1 Estimation while ignoring the endogeneity of political 
representation 
 
Table 2 shows the results of estimating equation (1) while ignoring any 
simultaneity bias. All specifications include a full set of district-level dummies, which 
equates to a "fixed effects within estimation" considering only variation in the data 
within electoral districts by subtracting the district-specific means for each variable. 
This removes any bias caused by time-constant factors (for example those related to 
political and economic history) within electoral districts which are correlated with both 
the amount of transfers and our major political variable of interest, i.e. ministers per 
district. Moreover, we add year dummies to control for any effects common to all 
districts in a specific year, and district-specific year trends to control for any omitted 
trending variable which might be specific to a district14. All reported standard errors 
are grouped (clustered) on the district level, allowing for heteroskedasticity and 
arbitrary autocorrelation between observations within each district.  
 
The specification reported in column (1) of Table 2 uses OLS to estimate the 
association between transfers and the contemporary value and up to three lags of 
ministers. The coefficients on the subsequent lags of ministers suggest that the 
correlation between ministers and transfers extends and grows over time. Adding up 
the coefficients for all lags, we find that after four years, an extra minister in a district 
goes with an estimated transfer increase of 21 euros per capita per year15. The 95 
percent confidence interval of this amount is [11,31]. The average number of 
inhabitants of an electoral district over our sample period is 519,086. This means 
that an extra minister is associated on average with an extra 10.846 million euros per 
year for his district.  
 
Column (1) additionally controls for the average gross income per district (in 
logs), as well as for the share of dependent individuals (retirees, unemployed and 
minors) in the total population. As expected, a higher average gross income goes 
with lower transfers to a district, and a higher share of dependent inhabitants is 
associated with more transfers. The gross income variable is highly correlated with 
many key socio-economic variables, making it difficult to separately estimate the 
relation between individual key socio-economic variables and transfers. The share of 
dependants has a correlation coefficient of -0.85 with gross income, and in some 
specifications which we will discuss below both variables will not be jointly 
significant. The inclusion of 20 district dummies and 20 district-level year trends also 
implies that a lot of variation within districts is already accounted for in all 
specifications, making it hard to additionally estimate the effect of slowly changing 
variables such as income or the share of dependants (unlike the more erratically 
changing political representation). Nevertheless, measures of fit suggest that these 
year-trends should be included, so we opt to include them to control maximally for 
omitted variable bias, at the cost of a loss of precision in the point estimates of other 
covariates.  
 
                                                          
14
 The estimation results for these dummies and district-level year trends are omitted from all tables.  
15
 It should be kept in mind in these calculations that the dependent variable transfers is measured in 1000 
euro per capita, and the minister variable is measured in ministers per 100,000 inhabitants. 
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 Table 2: Estimating the association between ministers and transfers  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Dependent variable: 
Estimation method: 
transferst 
OLS 
transferst 
OLS 
transferst 
sys-GMM 
transferst 
sys-GMM 
 
transferst-1 
  
0.158
*
 
 
0.894
***
 
 
0.941
***
 
  (0.0899) (0.0795) (0.0628) 
     
logpriminct -4.387
***
 -4.138
***
 -1.077
**
 -0.857
*
 
 (0.384) (0.449) (0.444) (0.415) 
     
dependantst 5.849
**
 5.682
**
 0.793 0.468 
 (2.708) (2.198) (1.094) (0.877) 
     
ministerst 0.0152    
 (0.0296)    
     
ministerst-1 0.0262 0.0725
***
 0.0711
***
 0.0766
***
 
 (0.0305) (0.0205) (0.0247) (0.0246) 
     
ministerst-2 0.0666    
 (0.0445)    
     
ministerst-3 0.101
***
    
 (0.0272)    
     
govtseatst    -0.0711    
    (0.0508) 
     
seatsmargint    0.0171 
    (0.0219) 
     
N 
Instruments 
AR(1) p-value 
AR(2) p-value 
Hansen p-value 
260 
- 
- 
- 
- 
300 
- 
- 
- 
- 
300 
41 
0.08 
0.398 
0.488 
300 
43 
0.08 
0.371 
1 
District dummies, year dummies, and district-year trends included in all specifications. Robust standard errors clustered at the district 
level in parentheses. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
 
As the association between ministers and transfers appears to increase over 
time, column (2) considers an alternative dynamic specification with a lag of the 
dependent variable included as an explanatory variable. A single one-year lag of the 
ministers variable is used, as it is likely that ministers require some time in office 
before they may start to affect decision-making and transfers. This specification is 
quite succinct, but it allows to differentiate between the short and long run 
association between political representation and transfers, and conforms to our 
intuition that the amount of transfers towards a district might be slow to adjust and 
may be conditional on past levels even when taking into account the different 
covariates in our model. However, it is well known that the coefficient on the lagged 
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dependent variable is biased downward when estimating using OLS in the presence 
of fixed effects, and indeed the coefficient on lagged transfers seems small.16 This 
bias might also affect the other coefficient estimates. The simple OLS results are 
nevertheless interesting, as the instrumental variable methods designed to address 
the possible bias due to a lagged dependent variable might also be subject to 
possible biases (see Roodman 2009a). Moreover, the bias of the OLS specification 
might be limited in our application since the number of time periods is relatively large 
with T = 16.  
 
The specification shown in column (3) takes first differences of the equation in 
levels to remove the fixed effects, and uses a GMM instrumentation approach to 
control for the endogeneity of the transformed lagged dependent variable (but does 
not yet control for the endogeneity of our main variable of interest ministers). 
Following Arellano and Bond (1991), the second to fourth lag of the levels of the 
lagged dependent variable are used as instruments for its lagged differences 
(difference GMM). Simultaneously, differences of the lagged dependent variable are 
used as instruments for the equation in levels (system GMM) as in Arellano and 
Bover (1995) and Blundell and Bond (1998). All estimation was performed using the 
xtabond2 command in Stata (see Roodman 2009b, for details). The results indeed 
suggest that the coefficient on the lagged dependent variable was severely 
downward biased in the OLS estimation. The reported standard tests for 
autocorrelation allow to reject the presence of first order autocorrelation in the 
residuals, but not of second order autocorrelation, which matches the assumptions of 
this estimator. The Hansen over-identification test does not allow to reject the validity 
of the over-identifying assumptions, but given the large number of instruments, the 
power of this test is probably low. A robustness-check in section 4.2.3 shows that in 
specifications with a reduced instrument set, the main conclusions of our analysis 
remain to hold and the validity of the over-identifying restrictions is upheld.  
 
In the specifications with a lagged dependent variable and a single lag of 
ministers, the estimated association between the one year lag of ministers and 
transfers in year t is given by  ∑      , with b the estimated effect of the one-year lag 
of ministers, and a the coefficient on the lagged dependent variable. For large t, this 
effect converges to        . As it turns out, this estimated long run effect is not 
significantly different from 0 for the estimates reported in column (3), due to the 
precision of the estimates, but especially due to the fact that a is close to 1. 
However, in the perhaps more relevant `medium run’, of –for example- 8 years, or 2 
full terms for a minister, the estimated association is about 40(20) euro per capita, is 
significant different from 0 on the 10-percent level, and is both statistically and 
economically significantly larger than the effect of 7.9(2.5) euro after the first year. 
The estimate after four years equals 24(10) euro, which corresponds rather closely 
to the estimate of 21(5) euro after four years from the OLS estimation in column (1).  
 
While the specification behind columns (1) to (3) may be considered as a test of 
the “law of well-represented districts” applied to government ministers, column (4) 
presents the results when simultaneously testing the core district and swing district 
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 Reversely, estimating this specification using pooled OLS, excluding all district dummies and year trends 
results in an estimated coefficient of 0.96(0.02), which is upward biased, and therefore can be seen as an 
upward bound to the true value. 
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hypotheses. The specification adds the share of parliamentary seats held by all 
governing parties17 combined per district govtseats (similar to Golden and Picci 
(2008)) to test the "core" hypothesis, with an expected positive association. To test 
the "swing" hypothesis, we estimate the relationship between net transfers and (the 
absolute value of) the difference between the seats share of the largest party per 
district and the second largest party seatsmargin (similar to Crampton (2004) and 
Milligan and Smart (2005)). The expected sign of this variable is negative. Column 
(4) shows that the estimated coefficients of both variables have both the unexpected 
sign but that they are not significant. Also note that adding these controls does not 
materially change the coefficient of the ministers variable, nor its significance18.  
 
The seats variables could also serve to control for some form of endogeneity in 
the minister variable: it could well be the case that the governing parties award 
ministerial posts to (party members of) their core districts, as a reward for the many 
seats won in the preceding election. Alternatively, the governing coalition could well 
award a minister to a district particularly if it is a “swing” district –e.g. if the governing 
coalition only won a small majority of the parliamentary seats during the preceding 
election in that district. With this latter strategy the governing coalition could envisage 
bringing extra visibility in view of the next election. Hence, the geographical 
distribution of ministers could be a tactical instrument. In both cases, it would be the 
share of parliamentary seats held by the governing parties (and not the choice of the 
party president) that would drive the number of ministers in a particular electoral 
district. However, our results suggest that such mechanisms only play a small role or 
cancel out, as the correlation between ministers and the two seats variables is close 
to zero over our sample period, and as controlling for core and swing variables does 
not materially affect the estimated effect of ministers19. 
 
Next, we test if the effect of ministers is different for the two major components of 
income redistribution in Belgium which make up our dependent variable transfers, 
i.e. the social security system and the personal income tax. The effect of political 
representation might differ between these two pillars of income redistribution, as they 
belong to the competencies of different federal ministers and ministries. Moreover, 
trade unions and employers’ federations have an important formal say in social 
security policy in Belgium20, but not in income tax policy.  
 
Table 3 shows the results of repeating the regression after decomposing our 
dependent variable, while using the system-GMM technique as in columns (3) and 
(4) of table 2. Overall, the fit of the specification seems worse than before, with 
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 Over our entire sample period, all federal governments were coalition governments. From the year 
2004 onwards, for any of the 20 old electoral districts the seats distribution of the “provincial” electoral district 
it is part of, has been used. 
18
 Also when operationalizing the govtseats and seatsmargin variables in different ways, the estimated 
coefficients are mostly insignificant. Most importantly they do not affect the size nor the significance of our 
major variable of interest, ministers. 
19
 Alternatively, it may be concluded from column (3) that for an electoral district, an increase in members 
of parliament supporting the governing coalition is not associated with an increase in transfers, as opposed to 
the findings of Evans (2005) and Jutras and Vaillancourt (2008) for Canada. 
20
 Some observers claim even a bigger say than the resp. ministers in charge, and complaints are heard 
from members of parliament that when they vote the budget, they have largely been kept out of the budget 
preparation for social security by the trade unions and the employers federations, despite the magnitude of 
the social security budget. 
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primary income not significant in explaining social security transfers (which seems 
highly unlikely), and a rejection of the absence of AR(2) in the residuals. The size of 
the estimated association between ministers and social security related transfers is 
larger when compared to the estimate for income tax payments. The latter point 
estimate is insignificant at the 10% level, however. As we cannot reject that the 
effects are equal for both types of transfers, we will continue to group them together 
and study the effect of political representation on the total transfers.  
 
Table 3: Separate analysis for our two transfer categories  
 (1) (2) 
Dependent variable: 
 
transfers through  
income tax  
transfers through   
social security  
Estimation method: sys-GMM sys-GMM 
income taxt-1 0.746
***
  
 (0.112)  
   
social securityt-1  1.040
***
 
  (0.0912) 
   
logpriminct -1.030
**
 -0.149 
 (0.438) (0.251) 
   
dependantst 0.838 -0.186 
 (0.918) (0.487) 
   
ministerst-1 0.0136 0.0396
**
 
 (0.0134) (0.0145) 
   
N 
Instruments 
AB-AR(1)  p-value 
AB-AR(2)  p-value 
Hansen  p-value 
300 
41 
0.072 
0.754 
0.989 
300 
41 
0.044 
0.073 
1 
District dummies, year dummies, and district-year trends included. Robust standard errors clustered at the 
district level in parentheses 
*
 p < 0.10, 
**
 p < 0.05, 
***
 p < 0.01 
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4.2 Instrumenting changes in political representation 
 
Previous contributions (such as Crampton, 2004, for example), do not consider 
the possible endogeneity of political variables when explaining geographical 
redistribution. Milligan and Smart (2005, p. 14) claim that, because in a strong party 
system like Canada’s ministers are appointed by their prime minister, they are 
exogenous to transfers. A similar reasoning could be applied to a strong party 
system like Belgium’s, where party presidents of the governing coalition appoint 
ministers. However, one might still argue that ministers are endogenous due to 
reverse causality. It is likely that, even in a strong party system, when a candidate 
obtains many personal votes during the preceding election, his party president will 
find it harder to deny this candidate a ministerial post. Obtaining many votes could in 
turn be due to having channelled extra transfers to one’s district. If this is the case, 
ministers would be driving transfers, but simultaneously transfers in a district would 
be driving ministers. As a matter of fact, it is hard to imagine a mechanism where 
ministers would channel transfers towards certain districts which cannot be 
explained by purely socio-economic factors, if not for attracting votes and either 
directly or indirectly affecting the probability of re-election or re-appointment. To 
isolate the causal effect of ministerial representation on transfers toward a district, 
we therefore will not assume that ministers are appointed exogenously.  
 
As before we will use difference and system GMM estimation to address the bias 
introduced by the presence of a lagged dependent variable; but we will now 
simultaneously instrument using changes in ministers which may be reasonably 
thought to be independent from transfers. We develop two alternatives to isolate 
such exogenous minister changes. A first approach is to exploit the resignation of 
ministers following various events (two examples are ministers resigning after the 
escape of a top-criminal and a food scare), policy disagreements within the ruling 
coalition (such as a controversial arms deal and an intra-coalition row over airplane 
noise over Brussels), or appointments of ministers in international institutions. In a 
second and separate IV analysis, we exploit the changes in political representation 
which occurred due to redrawing of electoral district borders in the reform of 2002.  
 
As a robustness-check we perform a third IV analysis where we use the system 
and difference GMM approach not only for the lagged dependent variable, but also 
use this approach for the political representation variable, instrumenting differenced 
changes in ministers with the lagged level, and vice-versa. This approach is similar 
to Golden and Picci (2008 p. 286).  
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4.2.1 Instrumenting using exogenous changes in political representation21 
Table 5 in Annex 1 gives a detailed description of 12 decreases in ministers over 
our sample period (out of a total of number of 62 changes in ministers), which we 
argue to be exogenous to the transfers received in a region.22 These 12 cases are 
due to ministers resigning (or being forced out of) their posts. Most of these 12 
resignations correspond to another change in ministerial representation as in most 
cases the resigning ministers are replaced. Our results do not change much if we 
include these corresponding positive changes in the instrument set. However, at the 
next elections, these newly appointed ministers may be more likely to be re-elected if 
they channeled transfers to their constituency, and their presence then would 
become endogenous to the transfer game. We therefore excluded these 
corresponding positive changes from our analysis.  
 
None of the 12 considered resignations are related to the preceding federal 
elections, nor to sub-central or European elections. They mostly comprise hard to 
foresee cases where ministers have been forced to resign because of some scandal 
for which they took the political responsibility, or chose to step down due to some 
disagreement within the governing coalition. All 12 are clearly unrelated to the “fiscal 
transfer game”23.  
 
Table 4 reports the results of our IV regressions. As before, all specifications use 
difference and system GMM, with the second to fourth lag of the lagged dependent 
variable as instruments in the differenced equation, and first differences values of the 
lagged dependent variable as instruments in the level equation.  
 
The specification in column (1) uses the subset of decreases in ministers which 
are due to a limited set of assumed exogenous causes (reported in table 5) as an 
instrument for the original ministers variable. This subset of changes is only used as 
an instrument for the equation in first differences in the GMM system. The resulting 
estimated causal effect of ministers on transfers in column (1) corresponds to a short 
run effect of 20 euro. Despite retaining only 12 out of 62 changes in ministers as 
exogenous to the transfer game, this estimate is both large and highly significant 
from 0. The estimated long run effect using this specification is large 214(244) euro, 
but is imprecisely estimated. The effect after a single term of four years is 75(34) 
euro, which is significantly larger than 0, and significantly larger than the short run 
effect. These effects are also large when compared to the results obtained in Table 
1, ignoring the possible endogeneity of ministers. 
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 We are grateful to Liesbeth Colen for her suggestions regarding the implementation of this IV strategy. 
22
 Using a mere subset of the original and possibly endogenous independent variable as the IV is an IV 
strategy similar to the one implemented in Dahlberg et al. (2008) when investigating the flypaper effect for 
Swedish municipalities. They use a census-determined (i.e. partial) change in grants to instrument the actual 
(i.e. total) change in grants received by Swedish municipalities.  
23
 A resignation unrelated to the “fiscal transfer game” which we did not include in table 5 is the 
appointment of then prime minister Van Rompuy to the post of President of the EU Council of Ministers in 
2009. Because of the government reshuffle that followed Van Rompuy’s resignation, Van Rompuy’s electoral 
district, Brussel-Halle-Vilvoorde not only lost a minister, but also gained a minister (Vanackere). The net effect 
of Van Rompuy’s resignation on his district’s number of ministers hence was zero. Our estimation results are 
robust to including Van Rompuy’s resignation into our set of exogenous minister changes. 
23 
Table 4: Effect of ministers on transfers, IV estimation. 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Dependent variable: transferst transferst transferst 
Estimation method: sys-GMM sys-GMM sys-GMM 
    
transferst-1 0.899
***
 0.864
***
 0.874
***
 
 (0.0901) (0.108) (0.0789) 
    
logpriminct -1.267
**
 -1.609
***
 -1.256
**
 
 (0.502) (0.555) (0.484) 
    
dependantst 0.684 0.452 0.794 
 (1.261) (1.638) (1.191) 
    
ministerst-1 0.200
**
  0.118
***
 
 (0.0788)  (0.0388) 
    
newministerst-1  0.273
***
  
  (0.0855)  
    
N 300 240 300 
Instruments 41 39 44 
AB-AR(1)  p-value 0.097 <0.00 0.081 
AB-AR(2)  p-value 0.446 0.074 0.41 
Hansen  p-value 1 1 1 
District dummies, year dummies, and district-year trends included. Robust standard errors clustered at the 
district level in parentheses. 
*
 p < 0.10, 
**
 p < 0.05, 
***
 p < 0.01 
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4.2.2 Ministers changes due to electoral districts merger as an instrument24 
 
As a second IV strategy, we exploit changes in political representation caused by 
the major electoral district reform that took place over our sample period, i.e. in 2002 
(see Introduction). As the maps in Annex 3 show, on the occasion of the 2002 reform 
the former 20 federal electoral districts were reduced to 11. To construct an 
instrument on the basis of this reform, we give up our earlier assumption that 
ministers continue to cater only for their original electoral district even after this 
district has been merged with one or more other electoral districts into a new, larger 
electoral district. We now re-calculate our measure of political representation to 
reflect the fact that some old districts obtained extra ministers when they were 
merged with an old district which had one or more ministers. We assume that 
ministers distribute their attention over the respective smaller old districts within their 
provincial constituency according to the smaller districts’ population shares.25 We 
denote this newly calculated variable by newministers. 
 
We subsequently instrument the newly defined newministers variable using as an 
instrument only the subset of changes in newministers which are due to the merger, 
denoted mergerministers. This instrument is presumably exogenous, if we are willing 
to assume that voters in the elections of 2003 did not vote with forward looking 
transfer-related expectations regarding ministers they could additionally vote for due 
to the electoral district merger, and that ministers did not anticipate the merger and 
did not steer transfers before the merger to their future new constituency. To the 
extent that these assumptions fail to hold, our estimate would in part still reflect a 
reverse causal effect. 
 
Table 6 in Annex 2 describes our instrument over the 2003-2007 period. We 
assume that our instrument takes values different from zero only over this period, 
assuming that ministers started at the earliest to steer transfers to their “new 
districts” in 2003. 2003 is the year of the first elections after the merger law was 
voted –in September 2002-, so we may assume that the “new” kind of transfers did 
not arrive in time to influence the election outcome of 2003 26 . We drop all 
observations after 2007 from the analysis, because 2007 was another federal 
election year after which ministers could have been appointed (or not) because they 
had been successful (or not) in steering transfers. Hence after 2007 we cannot 
safely assume anymore that our instrument is exogenous to transfers.  
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 We are grateful to Matz Dahlberg for suggesting this IV to us in the context of our analysis. 
25 For example, a smaller district with 100,000 inhabitants having one minister originating from that 
district, and which represents 1/3 of the total population of a newly instituted larger district, has a value of 
ministers (which is the number of ministers expressed per 100.000 inhabitants) of 1 when ignoring the reform 
as we did before, and a value of ministers of 1/3 when recalculating the variable to take into account the 
redrawing of constituencies as we do in the context of this IV strategy.  
 
26
 Our regression results reported below are hardly affected if we assume –as a robustness check- that 
ministers were already appointed in 2002, to reflect that they may already had started steering transfers to 
“their new districts” from 2002 onwards, anticipating the electoral boundary reform. Effectively, this reform 
was extensively debated in parliament and in the press before it was voted. But it was also quite heavily 
disputed before it was submitted to parliament, even within the governing coalition. After it was voted in 
parliament, opposition parties continued opposing it, including in court.  
 
25 
 
It is clear from table 6 that only a limited number of old districts obtained ministers 
because of the 2002 district merger. These are the 12 old electoral districts 
belonging to the provinces of Hainaut, Liège, Oost-Vlaanderen and West-
Vlaanderen. The boundaries of the other old electoral districts Brussel-Halle-
Vilvoorde, Leuven, Limburg, Luxembourg and Namur were left unchanged. The old 
districts of the province of Antwerp were merged during the reform, but this does not 
affect our instrument as there was no federal minister originating from these districts 
during the 2003-2007 period.  The last column of table 6 gives an overview of the 
values different from zero taken by our instrument mergerministers. The correlation 
between our newministers variable and our instrument mergerministers over the 
considered time period is quite high, with a correlation coefficient of 0.35.  
 
Column (2) of Table 4 reports the results of the IV analysis using these changes 
due to the redrawing of electoral districts as an instrument. The coefficient of 
ministers in column (2) is 27 euros, which is significant at the 0.01 level. Oddly, 
despite the fact that apart from the shorter sample and the different instrument, the 
specification is similar to the specification in column (1), the AR(2) test now rejects 
the absence of an AR(2) process in the residuals, which would invalidate the 
analysis. 
 
4.2.3 Robustness 
 
As a robustness check, column (3) of Table 4 shows the results when 
instrumenting lagged differenced ministers not with an external instrument, but rather 
using only the past information contained in its own second to fourth lagged levels. 
The coefficient on ministers is significantly different from zero, and smaller than the 
estimated obtained when using the set of resignations or the border changes as an 
instruments. 
 
As the Hansen IV-overidentification test loses power as the instrument set 
becomes larger, we re-estimated our main specifications using a restricted 
instrument set. More specifically, we drop the equation in levels, using only the 
equation in first differences (difference GMM). We drop dependants as an 
explanatory variable (as it is highly co-linear with income and quite often 
insignificant), we instrument the first-differenced lagged dependent variable only with 
the second and third lagged levels (rather than including the fourth), and do not 
include district-year trends but only the full set of year-dummies. This reduces the 
instrument count considerably in all specifications. The year-dummies account for 14 
of the remaining 18 instruments in the specification in column (1). The results in 
Table 5 show that our main results are qualitatively the same despite these many 
changes in the specification, and that the Hansen tests again do not allow to reject 
the validity of the reduced instrument set. 
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Table 5: Effect of political representation as measured by IV estimation, 
with a restricted instrument set 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Dependent variable: transferst transferst transferst 
Estimation method: diff-GMM diff-GMM diff-GMM 
    
transferst-1 0.861
***
 0.826
***
 0.838
***
 
 (0.114) (0.137) (0.127) 
    
logpriminct -1.436
**
 -1.700
*
 -1.495
*
 
 (0.627) (0.824) (0.724) 
    
ministerst-1 0.152
**
  0.113
**
 
 (0.0609)  (0.0417) 
    
newministerst-1  0.271
***
  
  (0.0891)  
    
N 300 240 300 
Instruments 18 16 19 
AB-AR(1)  p-value 0.079 <0.000 0.067 
AB-AR(2)  p-value 0.419 0.061 0.393 
Hansen  p-value 0.273 0.919 0.221 
District dummies, year dummies, and district-year trends included. Robust standard errors clustered at the 
district level in parentheses. 
*
 p < 0.10, 
**
 p < 0.05, 
***
 p < 0.01 
 
It is noticeable that all IV estimates are larger than the OLS estimates. This 
suggests a downward bias in OLS, rather than an upward bias, which is opposite to 
what we would expect from equation (5) with b1>0 and b2>0. Hence this runs 
counter to our intuition about the effect of transfers on political representation 
(through improving re-election chances). The effect might be purely econometrical, 
however, if the IV estimate removes some measurement error in the original 
independent variable. Another possibility is that there would be a difference in how 
some types of political representation have a stronger effect on transfers. One can 
imagine e.g. that ministers who suddenly need to compete for votes within a 
substantially enlarged electoral district (see maps in Annex 3), have a stronger 
incentive to channel transfers towards their constituencies, in order to secure 
visibility with the local electorate before the next elections.  These effects may 
dominate the removal of the bias through reverse causality, which might be small 
even in the OLS analysis as the variation over time in transfers var(u) is small 
compared to the variation in ministers var(M). 
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5 Conclusion 
 
Controlling for key socio-economic variables such as the local share of 
dependants in the population and average gross income, we find that per capita 
cash transfers to a Belgian electoral district are 21 euros per capita and year higher 
for every federal minister originating from that electoral district. This amounts on 
average to an extra 10.846 million euros per year per minister in a district. These 
estimates are of economic significance, especially when considering that these 
transfers may accrue to a subgroup of people within each district.  
 
The observed correlation between ministerial representation and transfers might 
result from a mechanism where ministers cater for their constituency in the form of 
transfers and are in turn rewarded by voters. Although we believe this empirical 
result is interesting in its own respect, further research would be required to prove or 
disprove the existence of such a mechanism. We subsequently rather focussed on 
estimating the effect of exogenous changes in ministerial representation on 
transfers, using two IV strategies. Although the point estimates differ considerably 
between specifications and appear large when compared to the OLS estimates, the 
different IV analysis and robustness checks are broadly supportive for the hypothesis 
that ministers steer transfers to their constituency. 
 
Our findings contribute to the literature on distributive politics in several ways.  
 
Firstly, regarding the types of transfers we consider, virtually the entire empirical 
distributive politics literature appears to deal with “pork barrel”, not with -supposedly- 
formula-based fiscal transfers to citizens, which make up the core of income 
redistribution in most developed countries. Our setup and findings can be juxtaposed 
to the setup of Dixit and Londregan (1998 p. 512) who assume that income taxes 
would rather serve ideological purposes and targeted handouts would serve tactical 
purposes; or Milesi-Ferretti et al. (2002 p. 647-648) who assume that public 
purchases of goods and services are easier to target geographically compared to 
transfers which are easier to target across social groups. By providing quantitative 
evidence of political influence in income redistribution, we provide support to 
qualitative claims such as by Besley and Coate (2003 p. 2628) who state that “even 
when spending is allocated formulaically, it is possible for legislators to manipulate 
such formulas to favour their own districts”.  
  
Secondly, regarding the type of political representation we consider, we do not 
know of other research explaining the geographical distribution of –supposedly- 
formula-based fiscal transfers between government and citizens through income 
taxation and social security by the geographical distribution of cabinet ministers. 
Persson and Tabellini (1999) find that proportional electoral systems –such as in 
Belgium- encourage “broad-based targeting”, as opposed to the “narrow targeted 
transfers” favoured in majoritarian systems, but the authors do not specify whether 
such targeting is implemented by the executive, by party presidents or by the 
legislative.  
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Finally, to our knowledge this paper is also the first to demonstrate for the case of 
Belgium that political factors matter with respect to fiscal transfers between the 
federal government and citizens. 
 
With respect to role of strong political parties as analysed by the distributive 
politics literature, we do not find robust evidence that in Belgium the governing 
coalition is able or willing to steer fiscal transfers to core or swing districts. This could 
simply mean that the interests of ministers and their political parties overlap27. It 
could mean that Belgian political parties reward their ministers with extra transfers 
for their districts in return for services rendered by these ministers to their party while 
holding office. Alternatively, it could point at strategic behaviour of ministers towards 
their party, i.e. at a principal-agent problem between political parties (the principal) 
and ministers (the agents) going on in Belgium. 
 
A number of questions remain unanswered. Although we argued that ministers 
might pressure their colleagues in the council of ministers, or within their party, as an 
explanation for our finding of a minister effect across the board, i.e. including for 
ministers not having social security nor income taxation under their remit, further 
research is required in this area, it would be interesting to consider whether some 
ministers have more influence compared others, or whether ministers affect transfers 
more within their own domain. Another question we left open is which channels 
ministers use to direct “taxing & spending” towards their electoral district. Do they 
design specific rules or rather bend their implementation? While we suggested 
possible mechanisms in the introduction of this paper, our regression analysis does 
not provide evidence in favour of nor against one or the other. However, a challenge 
for such a line of research is that one would be looking for mechanisms that are 
likely being kept hidden intentionally.  
  
                                                          
27
 In some cases over our sample period, the presidents of governing political parties were themselves 
federal ministers. 
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Annex 1: Table 5: Districts having lost a minister over our sample period 
due to his/her resignation for a reason not related to “the fiscal transfer game”  
 
 
 
 
  
Year Electoral district Minister Exogenous reason
1996 Verviers Wathelet Sr Appointed judge at European Court of Justice
1998 Kortrijk-Roeselare-Tielt Declerck Resigned after escape of serial murderer and child rapist
1998 Veurne-Diksmuide-Ieper-Oostende Vandelanotte Resigned after escape of serial murderer and child rapist
1999 Antwerpen Colla Resigned after outbreak of food scare
1999 Limburg Pinxten Resigned after outbreak of food scare
2003 Brussel-Halle-Vilvoorde Durant Resigned after coalition conflict about airplane noise over Brussels
2003 Leuven Aelvoet Resigned after coalition conflict about arms deal with Nepal
2009 Aalst-Oudenaarde De Padt Demoted by his party to the position of "government commissioner" without a reason being known
2009 Limburg Dewael Resigned after allegations of influencing a civil service appointment
2009 Limburg Vandeurzen Resigned after the collapse of a large Belgian bank (Fortis)
2009 Mechelen-Turnhout Vervotte Resigned after the collapse of a large Belgian bank (Fortis)
2009 Veurne-Diksmuide-Ieper-Oostende Leterme Resigned after the collapse of a large Belgian bank (Fortis)
Source: Wikipedia; Federal Parliament of Belgium
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Annex 2: Table 6: Number of extra ministers per district due to district 
merger over our sample period 
Source: Wikipedia, Federal Parliament of Belgium 
  
Year New electoral district Old electoral district Number of extra ministers due to merger Population share of old in new district Weighed number of extra ministers due to merger
2003 Oost-Vlaanderen Gent-Eeklo 1 0.42 0.42
2003 Oost-Vlaanderen Sint-Niklaas-Dendermonde 3 0.30 0.90
2003 Oost-Vlaanderen Aalst-Oudenaarde 4 0.28 1.10
2003 West-Vlaanderen Brugge 1 0.24 0.24
2003 West-Vlaanderen Kortrijk-Roeselare-Tielt 1 0.45 0.45
2003 West-Vlaanderen Veurne-Diksmuide-Ieper-Oostende 0 0.31 0.00
2003 Hainaut Mons-Soignies 0 0.33 0.00
2003 Hainaut Tournai-Ath-Mouscron 0 0.23 0.00
2003 Hainaut Charleroi-Thuin 0 0.44 0.00
2003 Liège Liège 1 0.57 0.57
2003 Liège Huy-Waremme 2 0.17 0.34
2003 Liège Verviers 3 0.26 0.79
2004 Oost-Vlaanderen Gent-Eeklo 0 0.42 0.00
2004 Oost-Vlaanderen Sint-Niklaas-Dendermonde 3 0.30 0.90
2004 Oost-Vlaanderen Aalst-Oudenaarde 3 0.27 0.82
2004 West-Vlaanderen Brugge 1 0.24 0.24
2004 West-Vlaanderen Kortrijk-Roeselare-Tielt 2 0.45 0.89
2004 West-Vlaanderen Veurne-Diksmuide-Ieper-Oostende 1 0.31 0.31
2004 Hainaut Mons-Soignies 2 0.33 0.66
2004 Hainaut Tournai-Ath-Mouscron 1 0.23 0.23
2004 Hainaut Charleroi-Thuin 1 0.44 0.44
2004 Liège Liège 1 0.57 0.57
2004 Liège Huy-Waremme 2 0.17 0.34
2004 Liège Verviers 3 0.26 0.79
2005 Oost-Vlaanderen Gent-Eeklo 1 0.42 0.42
2005 Oost-Vlaanderen Sint-Niklaas-Dendermonde 2 0.30 0.60
2005 Oost-Vlaanderen Aalst-Oudenaarde 3 0.27 0.82
2005 West-Vlaanderen Brugge 1 0.24 0.24
2005 West-Vlaanderen Kortrijk-Roeselare-Tielt 2 0.45 0.89
2005 West-Vlaanderen Veurne-Diksmuide-Ieper-Oostende 1 0.31 0.31
2005 Hainaut Mons-Soignies 2 0.33 0.66
2005 Hainaut Tournai-Ath-Mouscron 1 0.23 0.23
2005 Hainaut Charleroi-Thuin 1 0.44 0.44
2005 Liège Liège 1 0.57 0.57
2005 Liège Huy-Waremme 1 0.17 0.17
2005 Liège Verviers 2 0.26 0.52
2006 Oost-Vlaanderen Gent-Eeklo 1 0.42 0.42
2006 Oost-Vlaanderen Sint-Niklaas-Dendermonde 2 0.30 0.60
2006 Oost-Vlaanderen Aalst-Oudenaarde 3 0.27 0.82
2006 West-Vlaanderen Brugge 0 0.24 0.00
2006 West-Vlaanderen Kortrijk-Roeselare-Tielt 2 0.45 0.89
2006 West-Vlaanderen Veurne-Diksmuide-Ieper-Oostende 2 0.31 0.63
2006 Hainaut Mons-Soignies 2 0.33 0.66
2006 Hainaut Tournai-Ath-Mouscron 1 0.23 0.23
2006 Hainaut Charleroi-Thuin 1 0.44 0.44
2006 Liège Liège 1 0.57 0.57
2006 Liège Huy-Waremme 1 0.17 0.17
2006 Liège Verviers 2 0.26 0.53
2007 Oost-Vlaanderen Gent-Eeklo 1 0.42 0.42
2007 Oost-Vlaanderen Sint-Niklaas-Dendermonde 1 0.30 0.30
2007 Oost-Vlaanderen Aalst-Oudenaarde 2 0.28 0.55
2007 West-Vlaanderen Brugge 0 0.24 0.00
2007 West-Vlaanderen Kortrijk-Roeselare-Tielt 2 0.45 0.89
2007 West-Vlaanderen Veurne-Diksmuide-Ieper-Oostende 2 0.32 0.63
2007 Hainaut Mons-Soignies 2 0.33 0.66
2007 Hainaut Tournai-Ath-Mouscron 1 0.23 0.23
2007 Hainaut Charleroi-Thuin 1 0.44 0.44
2007 Liège Liège 1 0.57 0.57
2007 Liège Huy-Waremme 1 0.17 0.17
2007 Liège Verviers 2 0.26 0.52
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Annex 3: Federal electoral districts before and after the 2002 reform 
 
Source: Hooghe e.a. (2006) 
